What it supports
Grants, OpenID Connect, logout, tokens, and what is not there yet.
| Grant | Notes |
|---|---|
authorization_code | PKCE is required, S256 only (no plain). Codes are single use; replaying one revokes what was issued from it. |
refresh_token | Rotation on every use. Reusing an old token revokes the whole chain. A refresh checks access again, and carries only the scopes the server still offers and the client may still ask for. |
client_credentials | Confidential clients only. The token’s subject is the client; no refresh token, no ID token. |
urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code | RFC 8628: device authorization endpoint, polling with slow_down, and a verifier your approval page uses. |
Deliberately not supported: the password grant and the implicit flow (both removed by the OAuth 2.0
Security BCP and OAuth 2.1), and plain PKCE.
OpenID Connect: ID tokens (nonce, sid, at_hash, auth_time, amr), UserInfo, discovery (also as RFC 8414), JWKS with
key rotation, RFC 9207 iss on authorization responses, prompt=none, prompt=login and max_age.
Logout and revocation: RP-initiated logout (end-session endpoint), back-channel logout, token revocation (RFC 7009) and introspection (RFC 7662).
Tokens: access tokens are RS256 JWTs of type at+jwt (RFC 9068) with a jti, a family id and the login
session. Refresh tokens and codes are random 256-bit values and only their SHA-256 hash is stored.
Not there yet: prompt=consent / select_account (refused as invalid_request), front-channel logout,
DPoP / mTLS, dynamic client registration.